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Abstract 
 
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both developed and developing countries 
since the 1980s. This paper analyses the determinants of the wage share (labour compensation as a ratio to value 
added) using sectoral data with country specific estimations for selected OECD countries.    
We compile a comprehensive sector-level dataset of eight OECD countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US) for the period of 1970 to 2011, which allows us to trace the developments in the 
wage share across high and low skilled sectors and within manufacturing and service industries. Our findings 
provide new insights with regard to the drivers of falling wage share. By conducting country specific estimations, 
we analyse how institutional differences in industrial relations, as well as social security and welfare regimes affect 
the wage share.  
Our findings lend strong support to the political economy approach to functional income distribution. Technological 
change had an impact, especially in Italy, the US and for the total country sample, but the effects are not robust 
with respect to the use of different specifications and the wage share in most countries in our sample appears to 
be driven by variables reflecting the bargaining power of labour such as union density, adjusted bargaining 
coverage and government spending. The relevance of these variables differs considerably across countries, 
lending support to our approach of country specific estimations.  
We find that globalisation had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries. The effect of globalisation on 
the wage share was least strong in Denmark. In Germany, and to a lesser extent in the UK, the effect is due to 
outward FDI and intermediate import penetration which reflects the impact of international outsourcing practices. 
Intermediate imports penetrations had no significant impact in Spain while FDI played a smaller role in France 
and the US. Different institutional variables appear to be relevant for each country. Germany exhibits the most 
robust positive effect of union density on the wage share. Conversely, collective bargaining coverage, together 
with social government spending, plays a more important role in France, the UK and the US. Financialisation had 
the most pronounced effect in the UK and the US, while it appears to be also relevant in Germany. We find mixed 
results for the effect of personal income inequality on the wage share. However, there is indicative confirmation 
for a negative effect in Germany, the UK and the US.  
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1. Introduction  
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both developed and 
developing countries since the 1980s. This was accompanied by another trend towards greater 
inequality in personal income distribution, particularly by increases in income shares of the top 
1% of the distribution (Atkinson, et al., 2011). These developments indicate a clear reversal of 
the trends towards relatively egalitarian income distribution during the post-war era. This paper 
analyses the determinants of the wage share (labour compensation as a ratio to value added) 
using sectoral data with country specific estimations for selected OECD countries.    
Previous research has highlighted processes such as technological change, 
financialisation, globalisation, changes in government policy, personal income inequality, and 
labour market institutions to explain the decline in the wage share. Since many of those factors 
are either determined on a sectoral level or have developed differently across sectors and 
countries, a sector-by-country analysis has several advantages over previous research that uses 
country-level data or pools countries with different institutional frameworks. Furthermore, 
while country-level analysis always faces the question as to whether the decline in the wage 
share captures changes in sectoral composition rather than a simultaneous decline of the wage 
share in all sectors, we are able to isolate the within sector development of the wage share, and 
are able to abstract from changes in the sectoral composition. In fact, we find little evidence to 
attribute the decline in the country-level wage share to a change in the sectoral composition of 
the economy, since the wage share decreased in most of the sectors simultaneously.   
We compile a comprehensive sector-level dataset of eight OECD countries (Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US) for the period of 1970 to 20111, which 
allows us to trace the developments in the wage share across high and low skilled sectors and 
within manufacturing and service industries. Our findings provide new insights with regard to 
the drivers of falling wage share. By conducting country specific estimations, we analyse how 
institutional differences in industrial relations, as well as social security and welfare regimes 
affect the wage share.  
We confirm previous research based on the analysis of pooled aggregate country data 
attributing the decline in the wage share to financialisation, globalisation and a decline in 
bargaining power of labour, however, we find that these factors impact countries and skill 
                                                 
1 The time period is determined by data availability at a detailed sectoral level. 
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groups within countries differently. Thereby we confirm the upmost relevance of country 
specific institutional setting in determining income distribution. Although we also find 
evidence for some negative impact of technological change, albeit not robust, our results 
indicate that the increase in income inequality is not inevitable but can be altered by political 
and institutional decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short review 
of the theoretical literature the determinants of functional income distribution from the 
perspective of different schools of thought as well as an overview of the empirical literature. 
Section 3 introduces our data and the stylised facts. Section 4 presents our estimation 
methodology and expected results based on the theoretical considerations introduced in section 
2. Section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 concludes.   
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2. Literature review  
The issue of increasing personal income inequality, in particular earnings inequality, has 
attracted a significant amount of research. In contrast, changes in functional income 
distribution, i.e. the fall in the share of wages in GDP have only recently been the subject of 
research with an aim to pin down the effects of technology, globalization, and changes in the 
bargaining power of labour. Different economic schools of thought developed distinct starting 
points for their analysis of functional income distribution.  
The neoclassical approach, which also forms the basis for the New Keynesian analysis, 
starts with a production function with two factors: capital and labour. The relative income 
shares of labour and capital are determined by technology. If a firm produces in a fully 
competitive market with full-capacity utilisation and the production function is characterised 
by constant elasticities of substitution between capital and labour, the relative income shares 
of the productive factors are determined by their marginal productivity which is technologically 
given by the employment elasticity of output. Hence, the focus on technological change which 
characterises many studies in the mainstream economic tradition derives directly from their 
theoretical approach. There are two critical assumptions in this framework: fully competitive 
markets and full-capacity utilisation. As soon as the assumption of perfect competition is 
dropped, i.e. if firms and workers act in oligopolistic markets as is mostly the case, relative 
bargaining power is influenced by the price setting power (mark-up power) of firms 
(Stockhammer, 2009). There is a substantial literature in the New Keynesian tradition that 
derives from this (EC, 2009). Empirically, this approach is most prominently represented by 
the IMF (2007), EC (2007), Bassanini and Manfredi (2012), and Karabarbounis and Neiman 
(2012). Indeed, their findings indicate that technological change is the primary determinant of 
falling wage shares followed by globalisation. However, Stockhammer (2015) argues that a 
close examination of the reported findings reveals serious robustness issues regarding the 
effects of technology. While both the IMF (2007) and the EC (2007) report that the technology 
variables are not robust to the inclusion of time effects, they do not interpret the non-robust 
effects of technology with caution, but rather make a strong case that the fall in the wage share 
is an unavoidable outcome of technological progress.  
Consistent with the nature of modern capitalist economies, the relaxation of the 
assumption of full-capacity utilisation gave birth to Keynesian macroeconomics which 
emphasise the role of effective demand in determining output, income and employment. 
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Consequently, functional income distribution is governed by consumption of workers and 
capitalists and, more importantly, by the propensity to invest which is driven by aggregate 
demand and business expectations, i.e. the animal spirits of the private investors (Kaldor, 
1955). Most heterodox authors accept this analysis but augment the emphasis on animal spirits 
by additional factors governing the balance of power between employers and employees as 
suggested my Marxist or Institutionalist economists. Technology might affect the contributions 
of the factors of production but technological change itself is an endogenous outcome of 
conflict in the labour process. Wages are negotiated between employers and employees and are 
therefore subject to social norms and relative bargaining power. Consequently, scholars in this 
tradition have offered a more thorough analysis of the determinants of bargaining power. 
Marxist economists emphasise the sphere of production as the source of surplus and the core 
determinant of income distribution. Economists working in a post-Keynesian or Kaleckian 
tradition start directly from the assumption of oligopolistic markets and focus on the sphere of 
circulation. They emphasise the degree of monopoly in a market, which is determined by the 
degree of competition between firms, union power and, in a more recent interpretation of the 
literature by the strength of the financial sector (Kalecki, 1954; Hein, 2015). In the following, 
we refer to the Marxist, Institutionalist and post-Keynesian/Kaleckian analysis as the Political 
Economy approach. 
Although the New Keynesian and the Political Economy approach to income 
distribution start from different assumptions, both arrive at a bargaining framework to analyse 
distribution of income, at least in the more recent studies in the New Keynesian tradition. The 
difference is rather that the New Keynesian approach discusses the effects in a rather technical 
manner driven by a production function approach, while studies following the bargaining 
approach would always relate the developments to changes in bargaining power. For example, 
New Keynesian scholars discuss how globalisation changed the factor supplies or costs of 
intermediate products, and how this technically affects parameters in the equation for the wage 
share. In contrast, political economists rather look at how globalisation and financialisation 
increase the fall-back options of capital while decreasing the fall-back options of labour and 
thereby change the relative bargaining power between the two factors.  
Both the mainstream studies and the research in the tradition of political economy find 
substantial negative effects of globalisation on the wage share. IMF (2007) and EC (2007) 
employ import and export prices, immigration, offshoring, and trade openness (measured as 
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export plus imports as a ratio to value added) as measures of globalisation and find all of them 
to have the expected negative effect on the wage share. However, there is a difference in the 
interpretation of the results depending on the country group used.  
Publications focusing on within sector wage shares find mixed results. Country-level 
analysis always faces the question as to whether the decline in the wage share captures changes 
in sectoral composition rather than a simultaneous decline of the wage share in all sectors; 
therefore, in order to abstract from mere reallocation effect and focus on a distributional 
analysis it is crucial to isolate the within sector development of the wage share. This can be 
illustrated simply by writing the aggregate wage share as a function of weighted sectoral wage 
shares (EC, 2009): 
  
𝑊𝑆𝑡
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𝐿𝐶𝑡
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where i stands for the sector and t for the year. 𝑊𝑆𝑡
𝐶 stands for the aggregate wage share of 
country C, which is defined by labour compensation 𝐿𝐶𝑡
𝐶  as a ratio to total domestic value 
added (𝑉𝐴𝑡
𝐶) or GDP, and can be expressed as the sum of within sector wage shares 
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𝐶  . Consequently, a change in the 
aggregate wage share can results from changes in the sectoral composition, referred to as the 
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component.  
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Sector-level data allows to differentiate between the two processes and has thereby an 
advantage over country-level data. Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) fail to find a robust effect 
of sector specific import prices on the wage in all but one specification and do not obtain a 
significant coefficient for import penetration at all. They argue that the negative effect 
confirmed by country level studies result from a process of reallocation of production towards 
sectors with lower wage share brought about by increasing competition from abroad and 
confirm their hypothesis by additional estimations of low and high wage share sectors’ share 
in total value added. Thereby they refer to the between component of the aggregate wage share. 
They do find, however, a negative impact of offshoring, especially in high wage share 
countries, while FDI appears to be insignificant in their analysis. The negative effect of 
offshoring is furthermore confirmed by Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) for the US.  
Research in the tradition of political economy confirm these results, especially with 
respect to trade openness variables (Jayadev, 2007; Stockhammer, 2015), as well as 
intermediate import penetration and outward FDI for within sector wage shares in Austria 
(Onaran, 2011, 2012).  
Interestingly, there is a difference regarding the interpretation of the results depending 
on the country group used. The IMF (2007) and the EC (2007) focus on the aggregated country-
level wage share in advanced countries and interpret their findings as consistent with the 
traditional trade theory based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, as well as skill biased trade 
induced technological change argument of the new trade theories. Bassanini and Manfredi 
(2012) include both rich and (formerly) poor OECD countries and find the effect of 
intermediate imports to be negative for rich and insignificant for poor countries. However, the 
findings in the political economy literature (e.g. Rodrik, 1997; Harrison, 2002; Onaran, 2009; 
Jayadev, 2007; Stockhammer, 2015), which cover also the developing countries, indicate that 
globalization has a negative effect on the wage share in the developing as well as developed 
countries; hence point at a contradiction to the predictions of the traditional trade theory.  
Regarding the effects of the changes in the bargaining power of labour, the IMF (2007) 
and the EC (2007) both use standard indices for labour market institutions such as union 
density, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefit generosity and the tax 
wedge designed to measure labour market rigidities rather than to measure the bargaining 
power of labour (Stockhammer, 2015). EC (2007) finds that while minimum wages have a 
positive effect, higher employment protection legislation has negative effects on the wage 
8 
 
share; their interpretation of the results is that tighter employment protection legislation leads 
to higher bargaining power of workers and an increase in wages, but it does not increase the 
wage share, since the labour demand is very elastic. IMF (2007) finds negative effects of 
unemployment benefits and the tax wedge. Numerous studies also include direct bargaining 
variables such as union density, strike activity and collective bargaining regimes into their 
empirical analysis. Strike activity has been found to have a positive impact on the wage share 
(Kristal, 2012; Argitis and Pitelis, 2001), while ILO (2011) argues that collective bargaining 
arrangements and minimum wages could have positive effects on the wage share. Union 
density is the most commonly used variable with the best data availability and the most robust 
effect. It has been found to increase the real wage (Choi, 2001) – especially in countries with a 
low level of bargaining coordination (Nunziata, 2005), reduce wage dispersion, and limit the 
size of top income shares. Additionally, stronger labour unions are likely to exercise political 
pressure in favour of redistribution policies, thereby decreasing net income inequality (after 
taxes and transfers) (Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015).2 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the 
actual effect of unions may be underestimated in empirical studies since collective bargaining 
coverage greatly exceeds union membership in some countries. However, poor data availability 
limits the employability of collective bargaining coverage  (OECD, 2006), at least for the 
sectoral level. Stockhammer (2015) fails to find any statistically significant effect of the labour 
market institution variables such as employment protection legislation, minimum wages, 
unemployment benefit replacement ratio, unemployment benefit duration, and the tax wedge. 
The mainstream literature does not control for the effects of welfare state retrenchment 
or financialisation. In the political economy literature, welfare state retrenchment is found to 
be an important determinant of the fall in the wage share (e.g. Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007; 
Onaran, 2009; Stockhammer 2015); however, the measure used is often only aggregate 
government spending as a ratio to GDP, and is too broad to reflect the details of the welfare 
reforms essential to the bargaining power of labour. Kristal (2012) uses government civilian 
spending, which nevertheless does not capture the details of spending that is particularly 
important for the social wage and bargaining power of labour such as public spending on social 
protection or health and education.  
                                                 
2 Although some economists argued that stronger unions can lead to higher unemployment there is very 
little econometric evidence for this hypothesis (OECD, 2006; Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015) . 
9 
 
There have been only few studies investigating the impact of financialisation on 
functional income distribution. The term financialisation is not unambiguously defined, but 
encompasses the ‘increased role of financial activity and rising prominence of financial 
institutions’ (Stockhammer, 2015). Financialisation gained momentum since the 1980s. 
Similar to globalisation, it has increased the ‘exit options’ for capital which can now be invested 
in real as well as financial assets (Jayadev, 2007).  Furthermore, it has been argued that 
financialisation changed industrial relations and led to a ‘shareholder value orientation’ as a 
consequence of hostile takeovers of listed companies (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Financialised firms adopt a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy, which reduces prospects for 
labour to agree on a beneficial compromise. Similarly, the self-perception of workers changed 
due to financialisation, resulting in an emergence of ‘investor identities’ (Langley, 2007). The 
main indicators of financialisation applied are financial globalisation calculated as foreign 
assets plus liabilities (Stockhammer, 2009, 2015), current account openness (Jayadev, 2007), 
and dividend and interest payments and income (Hein and Schoder, 2011; Dünhaupt, 2013). 
Interestingly, all studies obtain a significant negative effect of at least one of those variables. 
Kohler, Guschanski and Stockhammer (2015) offer a systematic analysis of different channels 
through which financialisation affects the wage share including all of these measure and 
augmenting them by variables measuring the competition on capital markets (stock market 
turnover ratio) and household debt. They find the latter variable to be most significant for the 
determination of the wage share among all financialisation variables as well as control 
variables. The only study on within sector wage shares including a measure of financialisation 
is Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) who account for the ratio of financial receipts of non-
financial corporations (including interest, dividend and capital gains) to business receipts for 
the case of the US. The only paper, to the best of our knowledge, investigating the effect of 
financialisation on the wage share using firm level data is Alvarez (2015), who includes net 
financial income and interest payments as explanatory variables in his analysis of France. 
Summing up, the research based on a political economy approach uses mostly aggregate 
country level panel data, which does not differentiate the results across skill groups and 
industries. Within the mainstream literature, which argues the primacy of technological change, 
Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2012) use sectoral as well as 
country panel data; however they do not explicitly control for variables which would reflect 
the bargaining power of labour and labour market institutions, welfare state retrenchment or 
financialisation. IMF (2007) attempts to distinguish the effects on the wage share of the 
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workers in the skilled and unskilled industries; however the study claims that the income share 
of skilled workers rose by focusing on the share of wage bill in the industries using 
predominantly skilled labour as a ratio to the economy wide value added, rather than the share 
of wages in the skilled sectors as a ratio to the value added in those sectors, which is also 
mentioned in a figure in the paper. According to the latter indicator, which is reported but not 
discussed in the IMF study, the labour share of skilled workers is also falling in some major 
economies. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) and Onaran (2011, 2012) are closest to our 
analysis, but while these studies focus on a single country, the US and Austria respectively, we 
perform our analysis for selected OECD countries and are therefore able to account for country 
specific differences in industrial relations. Furthermore, we incorporate a broader range of 
explanatory variables.  
11 
 
3. Data and Stylised Facts 
3.1 Data 
We have compiled a comprehensive database for eight OECD economies drawing on six 
publicly available international databases for sectoral data which we augmented by country 
level data.3 We measure the wage share as labour compensation over value added with data 
obtained from the EU KLEMS database. Labour compensation includes the wage of self-
employed workers, imputed based on the assumption that their wage is equal to the average 
hourly wage of the sector. Different concerns have been raised with regard to this imputation, 
as it is generally said to overestimate the wage share for sectors of predominantly low skilled 
workers while it underestimates high skilled sectors’ wage shares. Indeed we find the wage 
share to exceed 1 in a total of 588 out of 13796 cases (4.26%) for data at 2 digits and 324 out 
of 10245 observation (3.16%) for the 1-digit level.4 However, wage shares exceeding one are 
not generally a problem and can naturally arise for mainly two reasons which have nothing to 
do with overestimations of the imputed wages for self-employed workers: First, if a sector 
incurs heavy losses and second, if a sector receives significant subsidies (EU KLEMS, 2007). 
The second case arises because value added in KLEMS is calculated as compensation of 
employees plus operating surplus plus taxes minus subsidies (on labour and capital), i.e. at 
basic prices, and therefore can fall short of labour compensation if the subsidies exceed 
operating surplus and taxes in a particular period.5 Since data from EU KLEMS is only 
available until 2009 we extrapolate through splicing. More specifically, we link the wage share 
from KLEMS with the growth rate of the wage share obtained from the OECD Structural 
Analysis database (OECD STAN).6 Both series have a correlation of 0.91. We control for 
violent swings in the wage share by excluding years where the percentage change in the wage 
share exceeds 30% in absolute values, which mostly appear in Denmark, the UK and Sweden, 
but our results are robust to all these cleaning procedures.  
                                                 
3 The use of an international database is instructional for making the variables and estimations 
comparable between countries. See table A1 in the appendix for further information on sector definitions and the 
skill taxonomy.  
4 This number excludes Agriculture, Fishing and Foresting. These sectors are repeatedly reported to have 
wage shares bigger than one because of poor data quality and because the imputation for self-employed workers 
largely overestimates the labour compensation for this low skilled sectors (EU KLEMS, 2007).  
5 It would be preferable to use value added at factor cost for the calculation of the wage share. 
Unfortunately, there are no long series on taxes and subsidies on production in EU KLEMS.  
6 Since self-employed are not included in the measure of labour compensation in OECD STAN we 
impute their wages by applying the same technique as used for the construction of the EU KLEMS database. We 
exclude observations where the number of self-employed suddenly falls to zero, assuming that it must be related 
to a measurement error. 
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In order to see how our results differ if we use the after-tax wage share we had to obtain 
measures for implicit tax rates on labour income, indicating the share of taxes paid out of wage 
income. The series are not readily available for many countries and for long periods; therefore 
we reconstructed the series using the technique proposed by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) 
with data from several sources of the OECD database. 
We obtain measures of the capital stock from the EU KLEMS database. Unfortunately 
only aggregated capital stock data is available at the 2-digit level.7 We extrapolate capital stock 
from KLEMS using the growth rate of the same measure from STAN. At the 1-digit level we 
are able to disaggregate ICT and non-ICT capital. ICT and non-ICT capital is reported as 
services (measured as an index) rather than stock in the newer versions of KLEMS. We prefer 
this measure over capital measured as stock because it is available for a more detailed sectoral 
disaggregation and more recent years in the newer versions of KLEMS. We do, however, use 
the stock measure for our descriptive statistics because it is impossible to aggregate indices by 
skill-groups. All measures enter our analysis as a ratio to GDP. 
Our globalisation variables are obtained from the OECD. Import data disaggregated for 
intermediate import and other imports is from OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database by 
Industry and End-Use Category. We calculate the ratio of intermediate and other imports to 
domestic absorption, i.e. value added plus total exports minus total imports.8  
FDI is taken from the OECD FDI statistics database and measures FDI positions 
(stocks) as assets minus liabilities of all parent companies to their affiliates. The measure is 
organised according to the direction of investment of the reporting country and all “positions 
of direct investors resident [in the reporting country] are shown under outward investment and 
all […] positions for direct investment enterprises resident in that economy are shown under 
inward investment” (OECD, 2016).9 We normalise the measure by the numbers of people 
engaged in the sector, which we consider to have advantage over other forms of normalization 
for two reasons: First, since we are interested in the effect of FDI on industrial relations, a 
                                                 
7 We refer to our data as ‘at the 2-digit level’ if we use manufacturing sectors at 2-digits. Most service 
sectors are always used at the 1-digit level.  
8 It would be preferable to differentiate intermediate imports by origin. However, given that a significant 
part of information on bilateral trade data is withheld for data protection reasons we were not able to meaningfully 
aggregate this measure by groups of countries. Unfortunately, data for most countries includes re-export and re-
imports as most countries do not report these series separately.   
9 Given the asset/liability principle of the measure negative FDI positions can result “when the loans 
from the affiliate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affiliate” (OECD, 
2016). 
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normalisation by people engaged in the production process seems reasonable. Second, since 
FDI is measured as a stock it is preferable to normalise it by another stock variable and not a 
flow variable like value added or output.  
Our measure of migration is the stock of foreign labour by nationality taken from the 
OECD and we splice it with the growth rate of foreign population for the years for which data 
is not available (in line with IMF, 2007).10 We include it in our estimations as a ratio to total 
employment of the country.  
Finally, for robustness tests we use an aggregate index of economic globalisation 
supplied by Dreher (2006) and updated in Dreher, et al. (2008) which combines de facto data 
from trade flows, FDI stocks, Portfolio investment, income payments to foreign nationals with 
de jure measure of hidden import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital 
account restrictions.  
Our only measures for labour market institutions available at the sectoral level is union 
density supplied by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Visser (2015). Data is only available on 
a very aggregated level of sectoral classification and not available for each year. Therefore, we 
interpolated the series between available years and extrapolated data for service sectors using 
the growth rate of country-level union density. Similarly, we extrapolated manufacturing 
sectors using the growth rate of the total manufacturing union density or country-level union 
density when the latter series was not available. Due to the large amount of data created by 
extra- or interpolation we have reasons to doubt the reliability of this variable, although this is 
more relevant for earlier years before 1995 which are included only in a limited number of our 
estimations. However, it is important to note that such interpolation smooths the data and 
thereby diminishes its ability to capture short-time adjustment in bargaining variables in 
reaction to certain political or economic events. Nevertheless, we think the results are indicative 
and important as this paper is the first attempt to analyse the impact of union density on sectoral 
wage share for several countries. We also check for robustness by using the country level 
aggregate union density variable supplied by the OECD.  Our second measure of bargaining 
power is adjusted bargaining coverage11 measuring the number of employees covered by 
                                                 
10 Since data for foreign labour and population by nationality is not available for the US we use foreign 
labour and population differentiated by country of birth for the US only. 
11 The variable is adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right 
to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees 
by the total number of dependent workers in employment). 
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collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in 
employment with the right to bargaining (Visser, 2015). This variable is only available at the 
country level. 
Furthermore, we account for social government spending defined as social transfers in 
kind from government to households measuring expenditure by government on market goods 
and services provided to households such as health care, housing, recreational and cultural 
services, education and social protection. This measure excludes social transfers in cash 
(reflecting welfare benefits), which we add to the previous measure for robustness tests, but 
unfortunately the latter series is available from 1995 only for most countries. We extrapolate 
our measure using the growth rate of government consumption for early years. The variable is 
measured as percentage of GDP and obtained from the OECD National Accounts at a Glance 
database.  
Additionally, we include the Gini-coefficient obtained from the “Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database” (Solt, 2014), and top 1 percent income shares from the “World 
Wealth and Income Database” Alvaredo, et al. (2015).  
Our country-level financialisation variables include interest and dividend payments and 
income of nonfinancial corporations as a ratio to total resources of nonfinancial corporations 
obtained from the OECD Non-financial Accounts by Sectors Database which is part of the 
Annual Accounts statistics. Furthermore we augment our analysis by a variable measuring 
household debt as percentage of GDP from the Bank of International Settlements Total Credit 
Statistics.  
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3.2 Stylised Facts 
While the observed decline in the aggregate country-level labour share is a well-documented 
fact, there is only limited analysis of dynamics in functional income distribution at the sectoral 
level. We find that the trend observed in the aggregate country level wage share is mirrored at 
the sectoral level, albeit with important differences between manufacturing and services sectors 
as well as high (HS) and low skilled (LS) sector groups and across countries as can be seen in 
Figure 1 below for selected countries.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
The wage share in France exhibits the strongest skill bias amongst the four countries. However, 
although there is a clear decline in the wage share of low skilled service and manufacturing 
sectors, high skilled services have lost out in comparison to their own position in the 1980s as 
well. In fact, the only sector group characterised by a slightly increasing wage share is high 
skilled manufacturing.  
In Germany the wage share appears to be quite stable until the early 2000s, which marks 
the implementation of the Hartz reforms – one of the most drastic labour market policy 
packages to be implemented in Germany. Thereafter all sector groups besides high skilled 
services exhibit a strong decline in the wage share, a trend that is only momentarily changed 
during the crisis. Indeed, the wage share of high skilled manufacturing industries declined by 
more than 19 percentage-points between 1993 and 2008, the strongest reduction in all sector 
groups.  
The UK presents a diverse picture in terms of wage share dynamics. While low skilled 
services experienced a steady reduction in the wage share since the mid-1990s, low skilled 
manufacturing sectors have increased their wage share in the same period, although they still 
lost out in relation to their position in the early 1980s. Turning to high skilled sectors, services 
show the steadiest wage share, which experienced a sharp decline by 9 percentage-points 
between 1984 and 1994 and afterwards stabilised at a lower level. The wage share in high 
skilled manufacturing is highly volatile and characterised by interchanging periods of increase 
and decline. However, it is 11 percentage-points lower than its peak in 1981 at 71 percent in 
2009, the last year of our sample for the UK, and close to its lowest level of 67 percent in 1996.  
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<Figure 2 about here> 
 
The dynamics of the other countries in our sample are similarly diverse as can be seen in Figure 
2. The USA and Sweden experienced a steady decline in high and low skilled manufacturing 
as well as low skilled service wage shares, while high skilled service wage shares appear to be 
relatively stable – a sector dominated by high wages in the financial sector.  
In Italy all sector groups experienced a steady decline since the early 1980s, a trend 
which has been slightly reversed in the early 2000s for high and low skilled manufacturing and 
low skilled services but not for high skilled services.  
In Spain wage shares look fairly stable over the whole period, but this hides a persistent 
decline since the early 2000s. One exception is low skilled service industries which 
experienced a decline of the wage share by 27 percentage-points between 1970 and 2010.  
Denmark is the only country where the wage share appears to have been increasing or 
at least stable in the low and high skilled services and low skilled manufacturing sectors, while 
high skilled manufacturing workers have lost out in terms of wage share in comparison to their 
position in the 1980s.  
Looking at the crisis year shows some interesting dynamics. Unfortunately, our data 
quality is worse for those years given that we are employing an unbalanced panel and thereby 
face the risk of sectors dropping out of our sample at the beginning and end of the time period. 
Nevertheless, we can observe some interesting dynamics. Historically, the wage share tends to 
rise during recessions as companies hold on to workers and productivity falls more than real 
wages, then the wage share falls back in a recovery. But during the 2008 recession the labour 
share did the opposite in some countries: it fell soon after the initial year of the recession, and 
when the recovery began the aggregate wage share kept falling in most countries. This trend 
can clearly be observed in the US, France and Germany. Unfortunately, our sectoral data for 
the UK is limited and ends in 2009, but nevertheless we can observe a decline for 
manufacturing sectors in the last years of the sample while service sectors exhibit an increase 
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between 2008 and 2009; also the data for the aggregate economy which is available until 2015 
confirms these trends. 
Summing up, despite the diversity of wage share dynamics across countries and sector 
groups, there are no sectors which seem to be exempt from the rise in inequality in functional 
income distribution across countries, an observation which cast doubt on two most commonly 
used explanations to account for the decrease in the country-level wage share in the mainstream 
analysis. On the one hand, there is reason to question the argument of skill-biased technological 
change as the main driver of functional income inequality, since it predicts an increase in the 
wage share of skilled workers while the wage share of unskilled workers declines. If our 
sectoral skill disaggregation roughly reflects the share of skilled and unskilled workers we can 
decisively conclude that this trend is not apparent the OECD countries. On the other hand, 
several economists have attributed the decline of the country-level wage share to a change in 
the sectoral composition of the economy, maintaining that the observed decline is mainly the 
result of traditionally capital intensive sectors with a low wage share producing an increasing 
share of overall value added (EC, 2009). Although our observation of an overall decline in the 
wage share across skill groups does not invalidate this explanation, it nevertheless provides 
evidence to the fact that changing industrial composition cannot on its own explain the decline 
in the aggregate wage share. This confirms previous findings by Karabarbunis and Neiman 
(2012, 2014) and Rodriguez and Jayadev (2010). Therefore, the analysis of the causes of the 
decline in the wage share remains an important question which can’t be merely attributed to 
technology driven changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
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Table 1 presents cumulative percentage changes of selected variables for non-
overlapping five year periods. Variables accounting for globalisation shows similar pattern 
across all countries of our sample. Intermediate import penetration, depicted in Figure 3, 
increased in all countries in both high and low skilled manufacturing sectors.12 The years of 
the crisis and shortly afterwards are the only exception to the otherwise increasing trend, which 
resumed latest in 2010 in all countries.13 The highest total growth rates were achieved in the 
1990s in Sweden and Germany, driven by high skilled manufacturing sectors which in general 
have a higher level of intermediate imports than low skilled manufacturing sectors. This is not 
surprising because our sample consists of high-income economies supplying high-skilled 
goods whose production process was characterised by outsourcing measures which substitute 
domestic production by imported intermediate goods. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
A similar pattern can be observed for outward foreign direct investment (FDI). Here we can 
see a strong skill bias in the sense that outward FDI per employee increased more for high 
skilled manufacturing and service sectors than for their low skilled counterparts in France, 
Germany and the US while the other countries experienced a rather balanced increase in 
outward FDI across sectors. The exceptions are always low-skilled service sectors which 
experience the least amount of outward FDI.  
The share of migrant workers in the total labour force has been increasing in most 
countries with the noticeable exceptions of Sweden, where it has stagnated, and France where 
it declined. Nevertheless, the share of migrants is very small in all countries, exceed ten percent 
only the US where the data is not comparable because it is measured as foreign-born rather 
than foreign labour force.  
The share of ICT capital in value added is usually applied as a measure of technological 
change in the literature (Bassannini and Manfredi 2012). We observe a steady increase in the 
                                                 
12 We focus on the analysis of manufacturing sectors for intermediate imports because the only service 
sector for which we have data is Recycling.  
13 These years are the reason why several countries have a negative growth rate for the last period. 
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share of ICT capital measures across all sectors and countries. There is a slight bias in favour 
of high skilled sectors in the UK and the US, but the general positive and sometimes even 
exponential trend is common to all countries.  
We observe a strong decline in union density for all sector groups in France, Germany, 
the UK and the US, while the decline is more moderate, albeit still visible, in Italy, Denmark 
and Sweden. Union density stagnated or even increased in Spain between 1980 and 2010, 
however not exceeding the comparatively low level of 20 percent. Since this can be attributed 
to a period of recovery after oppressed labour unions after Franco, we regard it as a special 
case. In most countries union density began to decrease in the 1980s, with the exception of 
France and the US where it has been declining throughout the whole sample period. Union 
density is highest in manufacturing sectors and lowest in low skilled service sectors. However, 
the latter group is also characterised by the smallest reduction in union density. Comparing 
countries amongst each other union density measured at the country level decline most strongly 
in the UK and Germany where the reduction constitutes 24 and 18 percentage-points 
respectively.  
Adjusted collective bargaining coverage also falls in most countries. The most drastic 
reductions in bargaining coverage can be observed in the UK, Germany and the US where it 
declined by 48, 27 and 18 percentage-points between the 1970 and the 2010s.  
We observe an increase in social government spending in our sample period in most 
countries with the exception of Sweden and Denmark where the measure stayed roughly 
constant. Interestingly, while social government spending increased or stagnated, its financing 
is more relying on workers’ income as can be observed by the increasing implicit tax rates for 
labour and consumption for all our sample (Onaran and Bösch, 2014).  
Personal inequality measured by the Gini coefficient increased in most countries with 
regard to its level in the 1980, with France as the only outstanding exception. A similar pattern 
can be observed for the income share of the top 1 percent, this time Denmark being the 
exception from the rule of increasing top income shares. 
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4. Estimation Methodology 
Our basic specification of the within sector wage share has the following form:  
𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑔𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑘𝑖𝑐𝑡𝐾𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡 +
𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑈𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3)  
where i is the sector index; t is the time index; WS is the wage share in sector i. GROWTH is 
the growth of the value added of the sector in order to control for the counter-cyclical dynamics 
of the wage share. KICT and KnonICT are ICT (information and communication technology) 
and non-ICT capital services as a ratio to value added in sector i; these capture the effects of 
technological change. 𝛼𝑖 is a sector specific coefficient. We do not include period effects in 
our baseline estimation since several of our bargaining variables are only available at the 
country level and are thereby statistically similar to year dummies while carrying more 
meaningful information.    
GLOBAL is a set of variables which capture the effects of globalization, such as 
intermediate import penetration and inward and outward FDI intensity. Intermediate import 
penetration is clearly linked to the wage share insofar as intermediate imports are related to the 
process of outsourcing to foreign companies. However, our data for intermediate imports is 
based on the conversion of commodity indices to sector indices and thereby doesn’t allow us 
to calculate how much of the imported product is actually used by each sector, which would 
constitute a proper outsourcing measure and requires the use of Input-Output tables. However, 
assuming that the use of imported goods stays relatively constant across sectors intermediate 
import penetration is a relevant measure for the reallocation of production abroad. We expect 
a negative effect on the wage share for low skilled sectors in capital abundant countries (as rich 
OECD countries are usually assumed to be), brought about either by downward pressure on 
wages to maintain competitiveness, through trade-induced labour-saving technological change, 
or a reallocation of employment abroad or towards more capital-intensive sectors in the 
economy (Onaran, 2011). The expected effect for high skilled sectors is more ambiguous, given 
that imports can also increase output if they are complementary to domestic production or 
reduce costs. The effect is theoretically even more ambiguous if one considers imports of final 
goods that are not produced domestically (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Onaran, 
2011). Therefore, effects are likely to differ across countries.  
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We focus on outward FDI since it is clearly linked to developments in the wage share 
while the effect of inward FDI is more ambiguous, and less relevant for developed economies. 
Furthermore, estimations with inward FDI didn’t change our results for outward FDI and the 
coefficient was not robust. We generally expect the effect of outward FDI to vary across 
manufacturing and services and potentially across skill groups. FDI is generally classified into 
two categories: vertical or cost-seeking FDI leads to substitution of domestic, usually low 
skilled workers by foreign labour, thereby creating negative employment effects in the home 
country while also increasing intermediate imports. However, there might be a positive scale 
effect related to vertical FDI if it increases exports through cost advantages or to foreign 
affiliates. Additionally, cost-seeking FDI might have an impact on the factor composition since 
the type of jobs created abroad are potentially of a low skilled nature, thereby lowering the 
wage share of low skilled domestic workers and increasing it for high skilled workers. 
Furthermore, vertical FDI potentially induce downward pressure on wages as foreign workers 
can be argued to increase labour demand at lower wage rates. This channel is most likely to 
impact both skilled and unskilled workers alike. Horizontal, or market-seeking FDI can also 
have a negative effect to the extent that it replaces exports. More likely though it will have a 
positive effect for high skilled workers because of an increase in employment at headquarters 
situated in the home country (Onaran, 2012). Generally, we expect these effects to be less 
pronounced in services because of their non-tradable character.  
Furthermore we test the robustness of our results with regard to globalisation with 
country-level variables like the KOF index supplied by Dreher (2006) and Dreher, et al. (2008). 
These controls, which are important because the variable constitutes an exogenous measure of 
globalisation, strongly confirm our results with sector level variables.14 
Our final variable accounting for trends in globalisation is the share of migrant workers 
in total employment. Previous findings suggest the effect of migration on the wage share to be 
negligible (IMF 2007). Theoretically, it can be either positive or negative depending on 
whether foreign workers complement domestic workers and thereby increase labour 
productivity or replace domestic workers while receiving a lower wage (and/or lower social 
security contributions). 
                                                 
14 Results available upon request. 
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𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺 is a set of variables related to the industrial relations and labour market 
institutions including union density (alternately at the country and sector level) and adjusted 
collective bargaining coverage at the country level. While union density measures ‘potential 
union bargaining pressure’, ‘the effectiveness of unions in providing and defending minimum 
standards of income and employment’ is argued to be better captured by bargaining coverage 
defined as employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of 
all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining (Visser, 2006: 39). 
Furthermore, we experimented with a measure of minimum wages as a ratio to the sectoral 
average wage as well as the growth rate of real minimum wages. Theoretically, an increase in 
any of those measures is expected to increase the real wage which will lead to an increase in 
the wage share if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than unity.  
FINANCIALISATION includes interest and dividend payments and income as a ratio to 
total resources of nonfinancial corporations, as well as household debt as a share of GDP at the 
country level. There are different channels through which financialisation is said to impact the 
wage share. Post-Keynesian literature emphasises the effect of financial payments of non-
financial corporations and relate it to an increase in the mark-up of employers if the latter is 
cost-sensitive with respect to financial payments (Hein, 2015). Alternatively, one could argue 
that dividend payments are an indication of increasing ‘shareholder value’ orientation, inducing 
a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy that will supress wages and employment (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Stockhammer, 2004; Dallery, 2009). Household debt has been found to 
reduce wage share arguably through increasing financial vulnerability that has an adverse effect 
on workers’ willingness to engage in collective action (Anderloni, et al., 2012; Barba and 
Pivetti, 2009; Kohler, et al., 2015). 
WELFARE is social government spending at the individual level as explained in the 
previous section. This variable is measured at the country level and is the same for all sectors.  
INEQUALITY is country level inequality measured as the Gini coefficient or the income 
share of the top one percentile, again the same for all sectors. 
We apply two main estimation techniques. Our baseline estimation is performed using 
the within estimator (also referred to as Fixed Effects Estimator), while we estimate the 
variance-covariance-matrix of the remainder error term using the approach developed by 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Therefore, standard errors are fully robust with respect to serial 
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correlation within countries, cross-sectional correlation between countries as well as general 
heteroscedasticity. Our main robustness controls are conducted with a first difference 
estimator. This has the additional advantage that potential non-stationarity concerns are taken 
care of given that all our variables are unambiguously stationary in first differences.15  
Since there is reason for concerns regarding the endogeneity and specifically reverse 
causality for our measures of globalisation, and because the effect of other variables will most 
likely be manifested with a time lag, all explanatory variables enter the equation with a lag. It 
would be preferable to employ a General method of moments (GMM) estimator to tackle the 
issue of endogeneity as well as the dynamic nature of distribution. However, due to the limited 
number of cross sections in our single country estimations this estimation method is not 
appropriate. Including our explanatory variables with a lag to mitigate potential endogeneity 
(or sequential exogeneity) can be seen as a ‘second best approach’ given our sample 
(Wooldridge, 2002).    
In addition to the pool of all sectors, separate regression analyses are performed for 
sector groups disaggregated as high skilled and low skilled sectors in manufacturing and 
services separately.  
In separate regressions we employ four alternative measures of the wage share for 
robustness checks: i) the after tax wage share calculated as explained in the previous section; 
ii) compensation of employees as a ratio to value added, i.e. the wage share without the 
adjustment for self-employed workers; iii) wages and salaries as a ratio to value added. This is 
a measure of primary market distribution since it excludes all redistribution measures including 
social security contributions; iv) a sample without the outliers in which we drop all 
observations where the wage share exceeds 1. If not otherwise mentioned in the text our 
estimations are confirmed by these robustness tests.  
We aim at using our variables at the most disaggregated level for which data is 
available. While our dependent variable is available at the 2-digit level of ISIC 4 (International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities), most of our explanatory 
variables are available at the 1-digit level with the exception of total capital stock and 
                                                 
15 Furthermore, we conducted robustness tests where we include a constant for the first difference 
estimations, which is equivalent to including a trend in our level estimations. Our results are robust to the inclusion 
of a constant and the constant appears to be insignificant in most specifications.  
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intermediate import penetration which are available at a 2-digit level. For this reason, we switch 
between the 2- and 1-digit level according to the specification as explained in the next section.  
Estimation period differs due to data availability depending on the variables used in 
each specification and country. While the data for the wage share at a sectoral level is available 
for 1970-2011, the data for the FDI starts only in 1985 and detailed data on imports 
disaggregated as intermediate and final imports start in 1995. The estimation period for most 
countries for the specifications including intermediate import penetration is 1996-2010, while 
it is 1986-2010 for specifications including FDI. Furthermore, data for our measures of 
financialisation starts in 1995 for most countries with the exception of France where data is 
available from 1970. It is mostly data on the capital stock that constrains the end year of our 
sample, although for some countries, like the US, data for the sector-level wage share also ends 
in 2010. 
We exclude the Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, and Mining and Quarrying 
sectors as well as mostly publicly owned sectors (Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities) from the 
reported estimations, as these sectors wage setting behaviour may constitute an outlier and may 
not be determined by the same forces as other sectors, but results are robust to the inclusion of 
these sectors.   
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5. Estimation Results 
Our estimation results are reported in Tables 2 to 8.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
<Table 3 about here> 
<Table 4 about here> 
<Table 5 about here> 
<Table 6 about here> 
<Table 7 about here> 
<Table 8 about here> 
 
We estimate the effect of intermediate import penetration on the wage share in specifications 
(1) to (3) at the 2-digit level, while specifications (4) to (8) include foreign direct investment 
and are estimated at the 1-digit level. Due to the different sectoral aggregation at which 
variables are available, we don’t include intermediate import penetration and FDI in the same 
specification. To avoid multicollinearity we estimate specifications with union density and 
government spending separately and exclude union density from specifications (7) and (8) 
since it’s strongly correlated with several country-level variables.16   
                                                 
16 Data availability differs across countries, especially with regards to capital stock data for France and 
the UK where our cross sections are reduced to eight and eleven sectors as opposed to 18 for Germany for 
specifications (1) to (3). Furthermore, we lose ‘the coke and refined petroleum products sector’ when we apply 
the first difference estimator for the UK in specification (7) and (8) because it has only 1 observation where all 
the data is available after cleaning. Exclusion of this sector does however not alter out results. We are able to 
increase the number of our cross sections to 11 if we estimate specifications (1) to (3) for France using data at the 
1-digit level. However, this poses a trade-off since our import data is available at the 2-digit level and therefore 
requires aggregation and because previous results have indicated that the effect of intermediate import penetration 
is better observed at a highly disaggregated sectoral composition. However, our results are robust for estimations 
at 1- or 2-digit levels with respect to intermediate import penetration. Similar considerations apply to the US, 
where availability of data on the capital stock for the service sectors limits our sample and Spain where there is 
only very limited data on FDI. In fact, for Spain our sample is reduced to two or three observations per sectors, 
which in turn creates collinearity between several of our country level variables. For this reason, we drop 
government spending from specification (7) and (8) while we estimate specification (8) without our 
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Globalisation 
We find strong support for a negative effect of globalisation measured by intermediate import 
penetration in France, Germany and the US, while in the UK the coefficient is still negative 
but rarely significant. Besides robustness tests using different estimation techniques as 
described in section 3, we estimated our specifications for different sub-pools, i.e. only 
manufacturing or only service sectors.17 This not only allows us to test the robustness of our 
results, but at the same time provides insights with regards to the variables that have potentially 
contrasting effects for manufacturing and services or across skill groups. However, since our 
cross sections are limited to a maximum of 20 sectors for the 1-digit estimations, specifications 
for individual skill groups can only provide indicative evidence. In the US and France, the 
negative effect of intermediate import penetration is mostly driven by low-skilled 
manufacturing sectors, while in Germany the effect is equally found in low as well as high 
skilled manufacturing sectors. However, it is not robust to estimations in first differences in the 
US and Germany.  
Outward FDI has similar effects in Germany and France. When estimated in first 
differences we obtain an insignificant effect in France in the pool with all sectors, however the 
effect is positive for manufacturing sectors and negative for service sectors (albeit 
insignificant).18 For Germany the impact of FDI does not appear to be robust for the pool of all 
sectors. However, the effect is negative and highly significant and doubles in size when we 
restrict our sample to manufacturing sectors only (first difference estimator), while it stays 
insignificant, albeit with a positive sign, if only service sectors are considered. In the UK there 
is no robust effect of outward FDI in first differences, however the coefficient turns negative 
and significant in specifications (7) and (8) for the within estimator. Interestingly, we find a 
positive impact of outward FDI in the US, driven by high-skilled manufacturing and service 
sectors alike, while the effect is negative for low skilled service sectors. However, the 
coefficient turns insignificant if the first difference estimator is applied. Furthermore, we obtain 
a highly robust negative impact of outward FDI in Spain, which however has to be interpreted 
with care given the limited data availability on FDI for this country. The impact of outward 
                                                 
financialisation variables. These data issues in combination with the limited availability of variables accounting 
for financialisation is also reason for the reduced number of cross-sections in our first difference estimations.  
17 Results available upon request. In the services sectors our data for intermediate import penetration is 
limited to one sector (recycling), but our results for the total economy are robust to the exclusion of this sector. 
18 Our measure of FDI is the variable for which we are most concerned about non-stationarity as our unit 
root test indicate that it’s integrated of order one. Therefore, we prefer to rely on the estimations in first differences 
for the analysis of outward FDI. 
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FDI turns out to be mostly statistically insignificant or not robust in Denmark and Italy, 
especially applying the first difference estimator. Generally, it is plausible that there is a skill 
bias creating a higher demand for high skilled labour through outward FDI if it is of a vertical 
(cost-seeking) nature. It is also plausible that this effect is less strong in non-tradable service 
sectors with a more horizontal market seeking nature. Other mechanisms like the threat effects 
associated with a change in the fall back options for capital and labour are also expected to be 
less important for high skill labour and services than low-skill labour and manufacturing 
(Onaran 2012). Our results confirm the different effects between manufacturing and services 
in Germany, while the skill division seems to be more relevant for the US. In Spain potential 
beneficial effects seem to be outweighed by the threat effects or substitution effects even for 
high skilled workers.  
Our country-level measure of migration has a positive effect in the UK, which points 
to the fact that migrant workers are complementary to domestic workers, while there is a 
negative effect in Germany. However, the negative effect in Germany is not robust in all 
specifications, and according to the estimations in first differences, the negative migration 
effect seems to be driven by low skilled manufacturing sectors. In France, the effect of 
migration is insignificant in the total pool, but is significantly positive in services; further 
disaggregation indicates that the positive effect in services is driven by high skilled services, 
whereas there is a negative effect in the low skilled manufacturing sectors. Turning to the other 
countries we find a positive effect of migration in Italy, clearly driven by manufacturing 
sectors, while there is no statistically significant effect in the US, Denmark or Spain.  
Technology 
Our technology variables aim at capturing the effect of skill-biased technological change on 
the wage share. We fail to find evidence for the mainstream hypothesis that technological 
change will decrease the wage share of low skilled workers and increase it for high skilled 
workers (EC, 2009; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012). Indeed, we do not find a significant 
negative effect of ICT capital services on the wage share in France except for specification (5) 
when estimated using the within estimator only. Non-ICT capital has a positive effect in first 
differences but the sign switches to negative when the within estimator is applied. The effect 
of ICT capital is even less robust for Germany where the variable is found to be positive or 
statistically insignificant in basically all specifications except for the manufacturing sector 
sample only if estimated using the within estimator. The effect is confirmed for two 
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specifications for high skilled manufacturing in first difference estimations. The same applies 
to non-ICT capital services that exhibit a robust positive sign only for the manufacturing sector 
pool, which is however robust to the application of different estimation methodologies. 
Similarly, the variables appear to be insignificant for most of the specifications for the UK. 
ICT capital intensity appears to have a negative impact on the wage share in the US, Italy and 
Spain, although we do not find an indication of a skill bias for the effect of ICT in any of these 
countries. Furthermore, in the US and Spain the coefficient for ICT is statistically not different 
from zero when we include variables accounting for the effect of financialisation and 
migration. Additionally, ICT capital turns insignificant in Spain when the first difference 
estimator is applied. On the other hand, we find a robust positive impact of non-ICT capital in 
the US, Italy, Denmark and Spain. 
Country–level variables and measures of bargaining power 
Turning to our measures of bargaining power our results differ significantly across countries. 
We report estimation results using our sectoral measure of union density but results are robust 
to the application of the country-level variable. We find very strong, robust positive effects of 
union density for Germany, mainly driven by the manufacturing sector. This is not surprising 
given the long tradition of sector-level wage negotiations in Germany. Similarly, we obtain a 
positive impact of union density in Italy and Spain, while there is no statistically significant 
effect in Denmark. In France there is no robust effect of union density, and in fact the variable 
seems to have a perverse negative effect in some of the specifications using the within 
estimator. However, union density was always quite low in France and is arguably not the 
essential measure to reflect the impact of bargaining power. When we replace union density by 
adjusted collective bargaining coverage, we obtain a robust and strong positive effect in all 
specifications in levels (using the within estimator), while it turns insignificant in first 
differences.19 Similarly we obtain an insignificant coefficient for union density in the UK and 
the US, while bargaining coverage appears to have a robust positive effect especially for 
manufacturing sectors in the UK and manufacturing as well as service sectors in the US. It is 
interesting to note that all three are characterised by a (relatively) low level of bargaining 
coordination and union density and higher level of bargaining coverage, which suggests that 
the characteristics of the bargaining environment are imperative when analysing the impact of 
                                                 
19 We report estimations with collective bargaining coverage only for France, the UK and the US, but 
the specifications with union density are available upon request. 
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institutional variables. Since bargaining usually takes place at the firm level in most industries 
in these countries, sector level union density can be argued to have less relevance and a country 
level measure capturing the general bargaining power of labour and the impact of collective 
voice might be more appropriate. Indeed, we find highly statistically significant positive effect 
of country-level union density for the UK (estimations in first differences) and the US.  
Social government spending has a statistically highly significant and robust positive 
coefficient for nearly all specifications in France and Italy, and is robust to the application of 
different estimation methodologies. The same holds for the UK although the results are not 
robust to estimations in first differences, and the US where we find a positive impact if we 
reduce our sample to manufacturing sectors only, while we obtain a perverse negative sign for 
service sectors. For Germany, Denmark and Spain the effect is not robust to the application of 
different estimation methodologies and the coefficient is mostly statistically insignificant. 20   
Since there are no measures of financialisation at the sectoral level we can only use 
country-level variables for which we obtain mixed results. In France household debt and 
financial payments have a perverse positive coefficient, while financial income has a robust 
negative effect. Similarly, we find a positive effect of household debt in Italy. However, all 
these variables become insignificant for estimations in first differences. In Germany financial 
income appears to have the strongest negative effect on the wage share, while the negative 
coefficient of household debt is not robust. Similarly, we obtain a negative impact of financial 
income in Denmark and of financial payments in Spain, albeit only for estimations applying 
the within estimator. However, in the UK, given the strong financial sector and the massive 
surge in household debt, financial payments and household debt both have a robust negative 
effect in all estimations using the within estimator, and these effects are mostly robust when 
estimated in first differences. All financialisation variables have a negative impact on the wage 
share in the US if the first difference estimator is applied.  
Our specification (8) controls for the argument that personal income inequality is an 
indicator of the command over resources and power relations, hence we include the Gini 
coefficient in our set of explanatory variables. The Gini coefficient has a negative effect in the 
                                                 
20 We have also experimented with an alternative measure of government spending: total social 
government spending comprising the sum of in kind and in cash social transfers as a ratio to GDP. Our results are 
largely robust to this alternative measure, but given that data for in cash benefits is available only from 1995 
onwards we prefer our current measure comprising in kind transfers only. 
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UK and Germany, while we find it to be insignificant in France, the US, Italy and Spain. We 
obtain a perverse positive coefficient in Denmark.  
6. Conclusion 
Our findings lend strong support to the political economy approach to functional income 
distribution. Technological change had an impact, especially in France, Italy, Spain and the 
US, but the effects are not robust with respect to the use of different specifications and the 
wage share in most countries in our sample appears to be driven by different variables reflecting 
the bargaining power of labour such as union density, adjusted bargaining coverage and 
government spending. The relevance of these variables differs considerably across countries, 
lending support to our approach of country specific estimations.  
We find that globalisation had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries. The 
effect of globalisation on the wage share was least strong in Denmark. In Germany and, less 
robust, in the UK, the effect is due to outward FDI as well as intermediate import penetration 
which reflects the impact of international outsourcing practices. Intermediate imports 
penetration had no significant impact in Spain while FDI played a smaller role in France and 
the US.  
Different institutional variables appear to be relevant for each country. Germany 
exhibits the most robust positive effect of union density on the wage share, while collective 
bargaining coverage plays a more important role in France and the UK together with social 
government spending.  
Financialisation had the most pronounced effect in the UK and the US, while it appears 
to be also relevant in Germany. Estimations for other countries are inconclusive and require 
analysis using data on a more disaggregated level. 
We find mixed results for the effect of personal income inequality on the wage share. 
However, there is indicative confirmation for a negative effect in Germany and the UK.  
We fail to find a robust negative effect of variables aiming to measure technological 
change, and we do not find any evidence of skill-bias in terms the effect of technological 
change, which constitutes the core of the mainstream explanation for increasing inequality. For 
some individual country estimations we observe that these variables are especially sensitive to 
the inclusion of country-level measures of financialisation or bargaining power. However, 
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these results are not robust to the application of different estimation methodologies. This 
suggests that while technological change surely has increased value added, the negative impact 
on the wage share is more likely to be an effect of reduced bargaining power of workers, 
enhanced by globalisation and a deterioration of bargaining conditions. 
Our findings have important policy implications. Rising inequality is not an inevitable 
outcome of technological change. Tackling income inequality requires a restructuring of the 
institutional framework in which bargaining takes place and a levelled play-ground where the 
bargaining power of labour is more in balance with that of capital. The impact of globalisation 
is likely to be significantly moderated and/or offset by stronger bargaining power of labour via 
an improvement in union legislation, increasing the coverage of collective bargaining, 
increasing the social wage via public goods and social security and international labor standards 
embedded in a broader strategy of global cooperation for high road labour market policies and 
macroeconomic policy coordination. Each country would have to address specific issues 
supporting the strongest positive drivers of the wage share while addressing possible issues 
that make other instruments of workers bargaining power ineffective. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that a simple attempt to reduce income inequality through skill-upgrading will not work 
as technological change does not seem to be the most relevant factor determining the 
distribution between labour and capital.  
 
  
32 
 
References 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A.B., Piketty, T., Saez, E. and Zucman, G. (2015) The World Wealth 
and Income Database. Available at: http://www.wid.world. 
Alvarez, I. (2015) 'Financialization, non-financial corporations and income inequality: the case 
of France'. Socio-Economic Review, 13, pp. 449-475. 
Anderloni, L., Bacchiocchi, E. and Vadone, D. (2012) 'Household financial vulnerability: an 
empirical assessment'. Research in Economics, 66, pp. 284-96. 
Argitis, G. and Pitelis, C. (2001) 'Monetary Policy and the Distribution of Income: Evidence 
for the United States and the United Kingdom', Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 
23, pp. 617-638. 
Atkinson, A., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2011) 'Top incomes in the long run of history'. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 49 (1), pp. 3-71. 
Barba, A. and Pivetti, M. (2009) 'Rising household debt: Its causes and macroeconomic 
implications – a long-period analysis'. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33, pp. 113-
137. 
Bassanini, A. and Manfredi, T. (2012) 'Capital’s Grabbing Hand? A Cross-country/Cross-
industry Analysis of the Decline of the Labour Share'. OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers No. 133. 
Carey, D. and Tchilinguirian, H. (2000) 'Average Effective Tax Rates on Capital, Labour and 
Consumtion'. OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 258. 
Choi, M. (2001) 'Threat Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on Labour Union Wage Premium'. 
PERI Working Paper Series 27. 
Dallery, T. (2009) 'Post-Keynesian theories of the firm under financialization'. Review of 
Radical Political Economics, 41, pp. 492-515. 
Dreher, A. (2006) 'Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a new Index'. 
Applied Economics 38,10, pp. 1091-1110. 
Dreher, A., Gaston, N. and Martens, P. (2008) Measuring Globalization - Gauging its 
Consequence. New York: Springer. 
Driscoll, J. and Kraay, A. (1998) 'Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially 
dependent data'. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 (4), pp. 549-560. 
Dünhaupt, P. (2013) 'The effect of financialization on labor’s share of income'. Berlin School 
of Economics and Law, Working Paper. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Visser, J. (2000) The Societies of Europe - Trade Unions in Western 
Europe since 1945. London: Macmillan Reference Ltd. 
EU KLEMS (2007) 'EU KLEMS: Part I Methodology'. Available at: http://www.euklems.net/. 
European Commission (2009) 'Understanding Labour Income Share Dynamics in Europe'. 
Economic Papers 379. 
Grossman, G.M. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006) 'Trading tasks: a simple theory of offshoring'. 
NBER Working Paper. 
Guschanski and Onaran, 2016. The causes of falling wage share and prospects for growth with 
equality in a globalised economy, Project Report for INET, (forthcoming). 
Harrison, A.E. (2002) 'Has Globalisation Eroded Labour’s Share? Some Cross-Country 
Evidence'. Mimeo, UC Berkeley. 
33 
 
Hein, E. (2015) 'Finance-dominated capitalism and re-distribution of income: a Kaleckian 
perspective'. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
Hein, E. and Schoder, C. (2011) 'Interest rates, distribution and capital accumulation – A post-
Kaleckian perspective on the US and Germany'. International Review of Applied 
Economics, 25, pp. 693-723. 
ILO (2011) 'The labour share of income: determinants and potential contribution to exiting the 
financial crisis.' in ILO World of Work Report: Making Markets Work for Jobs. Geneva: 
ILO. Chapter 3. 
IMF (2007) 'The globalization of labor.' in IMF World Economics Outlook April 2007. 
Washington: IMF. Chapter 5. 
Jaumotte, F. and Buitron, C.O. (2015) 'Power from the People'. IMF Working Papers, 
forthcoming (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/03/jaumotte.htm). 
Jayadev, A. (2007) 'Capital account openness and the labour share of inomce', Cambridge 
Journal of Economics. 
Kaldor, N. (1955) 'Alternative Theories of Distribution'. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 
23, No. 2, pp. 83-100. 
Kalecki, M. (1954) Theory of Economic Dynamics. New York: Routledge. 
Karabarbounis, L. and Neiman, B. (2012) 'Declining Labor Shares and the Global Rise of 
Corporate Savings'. NBER Working Paper No. 18154. 
Karabarbounis, L. and Neiman, B. (2014) 'The Global Decline in the Labor Share'. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 61-103. 
Kohler, K., Guschanski, A. and Stockhammer, E. (2015) 'How does financialisation affect 
functional income distribution? A theoretical clarification and empirical assessment'. 
Kingston University Working Paper. 
Kristal, T. (2012) 'Good Times, Bad Times : Postwar Labor's Share of National Income in 
Capitalist Democracies'. American Sociological Review, 75 (5), pp. 729–763. 
Langley, P. (2007) 'Uncertain Subjects of Anglo-American Financialization'. Cultural 
Critique, 65, pp. 67-91. 
Lazonick, W. and O'Sullivan, M. (2000) 'Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for 
corporate governance'. Economy and Society, 29 , pp. 13-35. 
Lin, K.-H. and Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (2013) 'Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 
1970–2008'. American Journal of Sociology, 118 (5), pp. 1284-1329. 
Nunziata, L. (2005) 'Institutions and Wage Determination: A Multi-Country Approach'. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67, 4, pp. 435-466. 
OECD (2006) 'Employment Outlook - Reassesing the Role of Policies and Institutions for 
Labour Market Performance: A Quantitative Approach'. OECD, pp. 207-231. 
OECD (2016) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics - OECD Data, Analysis and 
Forecasts. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI-statistics-explanatory-
notes.pdf. 
Onaran, Ö. (2009) 'Wage share, globalization, and crisis: The case of manufacturing industry 
in Korea, Mexico, and Turkey'. International Review of Applied Economics, 23 (2), pp. 
113-134. 
Onaran, Ö. (2011) 'The Effect of Import Penetration on Labor Market Outcomes in Austrian 
Manufacturing Industry'. The International Trade Journal, 25 (2), pp. 163-204. 
34 
 
Onaran, Ö. (2012) 'The Effect of Foreign Affiliate Employment on Wages, Employment, and 
the Wage Share in Austria'. Review of Political Economy, 24 (2), pp. 251-271. 
Onaran, Ö. and Bösch, V. (2014) 'The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and 
social expenditures in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter?'. Environment and 
Planning 2014, 46, pp. 373–397. 
Solt, F. (2014) 'The Standardized World Income Inequality Database'. Working paper. SWIID 
Version 5.0, October 2014. 
Stockhammer, E. (2004) 'Financialization and the slowdown of accumulation'. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 719-741. 
Stockhammer, E. (2009) 'Determinants of Functional Income Distribution in OECD Countries'. 
IMK. 
Stockhammer, E. (2015) 'Determinants of the wage share: a panel analysis of advanced and 
developing economies'. British Journal Of Industrial Relations. 
Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015) 'An Illustrated 
User Guide to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive 
Production', Review of International Economics 23, pp. 575–605. 
Visser, J. (2006) 'Union membership statistics in 24 countries'. Monthly Labor Review, pp. 38-
49. 
Visser, J. (2015) ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 Countries between 1960 and 2007. 
Available at: http://www.uva-aias.net/208. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
 
35 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: wage share in France, Germany, the UK and the US  
 
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Total excludes “Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing” sector.  
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Figure 2: wage share in Denmark, Italy, Spain and Sweden  
 
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Total excludes “Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing” sector.  
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Figure 3: Intermediate Import Penetration in selected OECD countries  
 
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Total excludes “Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing” sector.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of our sample 
  Cumulative percentage change in the Wage Share Cumulative percentage change in Union Density 
country year HS_MANU HS_SERV LS_MANU LS_SERV TOT HS_MANU HS_SERV LS_MANU LS_SERV TOT 
France 
1970-1974 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.10 0.00 
1975-1979 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 
1980-1984 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.21 -0.18 -0.28 -0.19 -0.18 
1985-1999 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.22 -0.23 -0.18 -0.19 -0.22 
1990-1994 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.08 0.08 -0.12 -0.09 
1995-1999 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
2000-2004 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 
2005-2011 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Germany 
1970-1974 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.05 
1975-1979 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.02 
1980-1984 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 
1985-1999 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
1990-1994 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 
1995-1999 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 
2000-2004 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 
2005-2011 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
United 
Kingdom 
1970-1974 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
1975-1979 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
1980-1984 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
1985-1999 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 
1990-1994 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 
1995-1999 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 
2000-2004 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 
2005-2011 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.16 -0.04 -0.16 0.08 -0.05  
Italy 
1970-1974 -0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.25 
1975-1979 -0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
1980-1984 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 
1985-1999 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 
1990-1994 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 -0.13 -0.09 0.00 
1995-1999 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 
2000-2004 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 
2005-2011 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.03 
Spain 
1970-1974 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02      
1975-1979 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.02      
1980-1984 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 
1985-1999 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.11 0.02 
1990-1994 0.11 -0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.16 0.31 
1995-1999 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 
2000-2004 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 
2005-2011 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.20 
Sweden 
1970-1974 -0.12 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.09 
1975-1979 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 
1980-1984 -0.12 -0.06 -0.16 -0.10 -0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 
1985-1999 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
1990-1994 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.05 
1995-1999 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 
2000-2004 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
2005-2011 -0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.11 
United 
States 
1970-1974 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 
1975-1979 -0.11 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 
1980-1984 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.25 -0.18 -0.25 -0.35 -0.17 
1985-1999 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 
1990-1994 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 -0.03 
1995-1999 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 -0.07 
2000-2004 -0.15 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 
2005-2011 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 
Denmark 
1970-1974 0.09 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08 
1975-1979 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.12 
1980-1984 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.00 
1985-1999 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 
1990-1994 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.13 -0.12 0.14 0.03 
1995-1999 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
2000-2004 0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 
2005-2011 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Total excludes “Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing” sector.   
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Table 1 Continued 
 
 Cumulative percentage change in outward FDI as a ratio to employment 
Cumulative percentage change in ICT capital stock as a ratio to 
Value added 
country year HS_MANU HS_SERV LS_MANU LS_SERV TOTAL LS_SERV HS_MANU HS_SERV TOTAL 
France 
1990-1994 -0.05 -0.01 -0.18 0.32 0.62     
1995-1999 3.64 0.27 2.22 1.81 1.00     
2000-2004 -0.14 0.17 0.27 0.20 0.24     
2005-2011 0.26 0.31 -0.08 0.03 0.23     
Germany 
1970-1974      1.01 0.67 1.03 0.90 
1975-1979      0.29 0.16 0.30 0.28 
1980-1984      0.28 0.30 0.27 0.29 
1985-1999 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.16 0.19 
1990-1994 -0.38 0.16 0.47 -0.08 0.30 0.35 0.85 0.42 0.21 
1995-1999 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.62 1.04 0.56 0.39 0.65 0.42 
2000-2004 -0.02 -0.21 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.44 0.31 
2005-2011 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.31 0.09 0.72 0.78 0.70 0.62 
United 
Kingdom 
1970-1974      1.06  0.63 0.30 
1975-1979      0.29  0.52 0.27 
1980-1984      0.20 0.43 0.76 0.32 
1985-1999      0.28 0.37 0.56 0.63 
1990-1994 0.07 -0.20 0.35 0.07 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.26 
1995-1999 2.14 0.75 0.16 0.04 0.85 0.72 1.34 0.74 0.83 
2000-2004 -0.19 -0.27 -0.08 0.50 -0.08 0.68 0.25 0.67 0.50 
2005-2011          
Italy 
1970-1974      0.30 -0.32 0.14 0.24 
1975-1979      0.09 -0.15 0.48 0.20 
1980-1984      0.18 0.18 0.61 0.26 
1985-1999 1.20 0.59 0.37 1.68 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.54 0.34 
1990-1994 0.58 0.81 2.23 0.12 0.80 0.17 -0.04 1.80 0.21 
1995-1999 1.01 0.85 1.50 0.92 0.80 0.97 0.57 0.44 0.47 
2000-2004 -0.17 -0.85 0.13 -0.41 -0.11 0.55 0.24 0.30 0.32 
2005-2011 -0.50 0.46 -0.13 1.49 0.22 0.53 0.44 0.31 0.33 
Spain 
1970-1974          
1975-1979          
1980-1984      0.96 0.03 0.15 0.31 
1985-1999      0.55 0.19 0.38 0.34 
1990-1994      0.20 0.05 0.14 0.15 
1995-1999     2.47 0.86 0.45 0.44 0.44 
2000-2004     0.47 0.64 0.31 0.31 0.31 
2005-2011 7.27 -0.08 3.53 1.80 0.47 0.42 0.52 0.44 0.40 
Sweden 
1970-1974          
1975-1979          
1980-1984          
1985-1999          
1990-1994     0.58     
1995-1999 2.01 0.00 2.76 0.44 0.79 0.60 0.25 0.53 0.41 
2000-2004 0.16 0.94 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.13 -0.05 0.23 0.11 
2005-2011 0.46 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.35     
United 
States 
1970-1974          
1975-1979          
1980-1984      1.86 0.79 0.95 0.36 
1985-1999 0.67 1.97 0.95 0.51 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.62 0.30 
1990-1994 0.44 0.51 0.60 -0.26 0.41 0.58 0.52 0.39 0.34 
1995-1999 0.23 1.15 0.43 0.36 0.74 0.75 1.04 1.03 0.83 
2000-2004 0.36 0.94 0.46 0.23 0.60 0.51 0.15 0.49 0.33 
2005-2011 0.23 0.68 0.25 0.24 0.50     
Denmark 
1970-1974      0.24 -0.02 0.09 0.12 
1975-1979      0.31 0.73 0.67 0.53 
1980-1984      1.60 1.40 1.13 1.20 
1985-1999      0.69 0.79 0.80 0.75 
1990-1994      0.37 0.94 0.69 0.55 
1995-1999      0.96 1.20 1.04 1.17 
2000-2004 -0.05 -0.69 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.48 0.91 1.12 0.82 
2005-2011 1.97 0.92 3.24 0.77 0.16     
Source: Own calculations; see Section 3.1 for detailed sources. Excluding “Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing” sector.  
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Table 2: Estimation results for France, all sectors 
 Within Estimator First Difference Estimator  
FRA_1 FRA_2 FRA_3 FRA_4 FRA_5 FRA_6 FRA_7 FRA_8 FRA_1 FRA_2 FRA_3 FRA_4 FRA_5 FRA_6 FRA_7 FRA_8 
growth -0.045 -0.036 -0.007 -0.253*** -0.263*** -0.209*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.182*** -0.183*** -0.180*** -0.263*** -0.274*** -0.260*** -0.269*** -0.268***  
(0.515) (0.604) (0.925) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital stock_t-1 0.119*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 
     
0.276*** 0.273*** 0.275*** 
     
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
int. imports_t-1 -0.420*** -0.631*** -0.629*** 
     
-0.486* -0.473* -0.487* 
     
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.000) 
     
(0.083) (0.094) (0.085) 
     
other imports_t-1 0.637*** 0.557*** 0.522*** 
     
0.292*** 0.277*** 0.283*** 
     
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
social government_t-1 
 
0.022*** 
  
0.026*** 
 
0.010** 0.009** 
 
0.008 
  
0.017*** 
 
0.012*** 0.011**   
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.013) (0.035) 
 
(0.382) 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) (0.032) 
bargaining cov_t-1 
  
0.010*** 
  
0.009*** 
    
0.005 
  
0.004 
  
   
(0.001) 
  
(0.005) 
    
(0.441) 
  
(0.110) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
0.017 -0.023* -0.023 -0.002 -0.002 
   
0.002 0.004 -0.010 -0.001 0.001     
(0.183) (0.070) (0.114) (0.907) (0.911) 
   
(0.877) (0.807) (0.540) (0.957) (0.944) 
non-ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.075** -0.043* -0.036 -0.069*** -0.069*** 
   
0.141*** 0.107*** 0.154*** 0.110*** 0.106***     
(0.013) (0.057) (0.147) (0.002) (0.002) 
   
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) 
outward FDI_t-1 
   
0.281*** 0.261*** 0.236** 0.234** 0.233** 
   
-0.038 -0.025 -0.035 -0.033 -0.037     
(0.001) (0.006) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
   
(0.707) (0.807) (0.731) (0.751) (0.728) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
0.078*** 0.069*** 
      
0.073** 0.067*        
(0.001) (0.002) 
      
(0.045) (0.052) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
-0.057*** -0.053** 
      
-0.016 -0.010        
(0.003) (0.014) 
      
(0.510) (0.678) 
fin. payments_t-1 
      
0.134*** 0.139*** 
      
0.035 0.033        
(0.000) (0.000) 
      
(0.377) (0.407) 
migration_t-1 
      
0.041 -0.065 
      
-0.513 -0.481        
(0.925) (0.901) 
      
(0.480) (0.507) 
gini_t-1 
       
0.001 
       
0.003         
(0.479) 
       
(0.481) 
constant 0.458*** 0.200*** -0.438** 0.330*** -0.089 -0.557* -0.154 -0.131 
        
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.024) (0.006) (0.656) (0.097) (0.475) (0.537) 
        
withR2 0.560 0.594 0.610 0.234 0.311 0.280 0.368 0.368 0.338 0.336 0.336 0.288 0.322 0.290 0.329 0.328 
F-test 74.130 70.228 143.113 14.990 23.231 14.254 1064.448 1108.347 13.186 12.708 10.418 14.833 15.723 13.259 11.576 10.525 
obs 138 138 138 391 391 391 391 391 125 125 125 367 367 367 367 367 
number of sectors 8 8 8 20 20 20 20 20 8 8 8 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 3: Estimation results for Germany, all sectors 
 Within Estimator First Difference Estimator 
 DEU_1 DEU_2 DEU_3 DEU_4 DEU_5 DEU_6 DEU_7 DEU_8 DEU_1 DEU_2 DEU_3 DEU_4 DEU_5 DEU_6 DEU_7 DEU_8 
growth -0.233*** -
0.225*** 
-0.261*** -0.230*** -0.229*** -0.250*** -0.203** -0.212** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.301*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.333*** -0.334*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital stock_t-1 0.016 0.038 0.024 
     
0.193*** 0.184*** 0.184** 
     
 
(0.719) (0.372) (0.369) 
     
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
     
int. imports_t-1 -0.254*** -0.207** 0.075 
     
-0.035 -0.038 -0.013 
     
 
(0.007) (0.043) (0.296) 
     
(0.740) (0.721) (0.910) 
     
other imports_t-1 0.019 0.039 0.137* 
     
0.009 0.005 0.015 
     
 
(0.774) (0.622) (0.084) 
     
(0.868) (0.916) (0.769) 
     
social government_t-1 
 
-0.029** 
  
-0.003 
 
-0.001 0.005 
 
0.005 
  
-0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001   
(0.023) 
  
(0.512) 
 
(0.956) (0.713) 
 
(0.423) 
  
(0.840) 
 
(0.909) (0.931) 
sec. union density_t-1 
  
0.009*** 
  
0.009*** 
    
0.003 
  
0.002 
  
   
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
    
(0.187) 
  
(0.295) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.017 -0.015 0.069*** 0.090** 0.139** 
   
0.020 0.021 0.041 0.017 0.003     
(0.168) (0.285) (0.002) (0.026) (0.029) 
   
(0.474) (0.456) (0.308) (0.607) (0.924) 
non-ICT capital_t-1 
   
0.059 0.059 -0.031 0.007 -0.058 
   
0.150*** 0.152*** 0.126** 0.226*** 0.239***     
(0.118) (0.118) (0.401) (0.925) (0.571) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
outward FDI_t-1 
   
0.659** 0.668** 0.508** 0.849*** 0.848*** 
   
-0.388* -0.388* -0.389 0.372* 0.372*     
(0.015) (0.011) (0.033) (0.002) (0.003) 
   
(0.098) (0.099) (0.103) (0.070) (0.068) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
-0.098 -0.298 
      
-0.000 0.044        
(0.253) (0.116) 
      
(0.999) (0.583) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
-0.083** -0.022 
      
-0.043*** -0.044***        
(0.024) (0.243) 
      
(0.007) (0.006) 
fin. payments_t-1 
      
-0.097 -0.157 
      
0.120** 0.128***        
(0.432) (0.187) 
      
(0.015) (0.007) 
migration_t-1 
      
-12.318*** -7.317*** 
      
-3.918*** -4.497***        
(0.001) (0.007) 
      
(0.001) (0.000) 
gini_t-1 
       
-0.056* 
       
0.009         
(0.098) 
       
(0.272) 
constant 0.770*** 1.067*** 0.273*** 0.959*** 1.004*** 0.661*** 2.655*** 4.509*** 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) 
        
withR2/adjR2 0.185 0.205 0.434 0.2 0.2 0.324 0.296 0.325 0.455 0.454 0.456 0.428 0.427 0.428 0.504 0.504 
F-test 13.374 11.114 57.872 13.023 12.692 28.836 533.101 307.947 11.244 9.451 12.384 21.094 16.905 18.429 10.492 10.988 
obs 340 340 340 407 407 407 281 281 318 318 318 380 380 380 256 256 
number of sectors 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 18 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Estimation results for the United Kingdom, all sectors 
  Within Estimator First Difference Estimator  
GBR_1 GBR_2 GBR_3 GBR_4 GBR_5 GBR_6 GBR_7 GBR_8 GBR_1 GBR_2 GBR_3 GBR_4 GBR_5 GBR_6 GBR_7 GBR_8 
growth -0.341** -0.380** -0.333** -0.264** -0.265** -0.275** -0.125* -0.117 -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.073 -0.073  
(0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.098) (0.114) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.256) 
capital stock_t-1 0.118** 0.114*** 0.130** 
     
0.185*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 
     
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.012) 
     
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
     
int. imports_t-1 -0.197 -0.259 -0.113 
     
-0.254 -0.237 -0.230* 
     
 
(0.464) (0.330) (0.622) 
     
(0.101) (0.118) (0.111) 
     
other imports_t-1 0.114*** 0.044 0.143*** 
     
0.032 0.038 0.041 
     
 
(0.005) (0.399) (0.004) 
     
(0.477) (0.407) (0.351) 
     
social 
government_t-1 
 
0.020** 
  
0.001 
 
0.020* 0.018* 
 
-0.005 
  
-0.006 
 
0.002 0.002 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.801) 
 
(0.052) (0.061) 
 
(0.498) 
  
(0.400) 
 
(0.920) (0.927) 
bargaining cov_t-1 
  
0.003 
  
0.003* 
    
0.005** 
  
0.001 
  
   
(0.123) 
  
(0.079) 
    
(0.012) 
  
(0.392) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.001 -0.002 0.019** -0.012 -0.019 
   
0.016 0.019 0.024 0.030 0.031     
(0.865) (0.802) (0.045) (0.706) (0.584) 
   
(0.292) (0.224) (0.143) (0.481) (0.392) 
non-ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.033 -0.033 -0.062 0.058 0.064 
   
0.110* 0.112* 0.099* 0.027 0.026     
(0.449) (0.447) (0.202) (0.296) (0.270) 
   
(0.070) (0.067) (0.100) (0.764) (0.752) 
outward FDI_t-1 
   
0.097 0.094 0.107 -0.125** -0.118** 
   
-0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.069 -0.070     
(0.557) (0.578) (0.520) (0.017) (0.020) 
   
(0.943) (0.937) (0.966) (0.418) (0.438) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
-0.283*** -0.268*** 
      
-0.226 -0.226        
(0.004) (0.002) 
      
(0.210) (0.209) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
0.030* 0.020*** 
      
0.023* 0.023*        
(0.055) (0.001) 
      
(0.079) (0.093) 
fin. payments_t-1 
      
-0.102*** -0.103*** 
      
-0.089* -0.089**        
(0.000) (0.000) 
      
(0.052) (0.042) 
migration_t-1 
      
1.425*** 2.080*** 
      
1.436* 1.403*        
(0.000) (0.000) 
      
(0.072) (0.085) 
gini_t-1 
       
-0.008** 
       
0.001         
(0.028) 
       
(0.945) 
constant 0.626*** 0.454*** 0.493*** 0.501** 0.478* 0.350 1.873*** 2.062*** 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.065) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
withR2 0.208 0.248 0.225 0.077 0.077 0.106 0.092 0.097 0.087 0.084 0.116 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.011 0.001 
F-test 11.944 10.223 10.797 5.476 6.224 5.228 5561.640 1071.984 4.783 3.699 4.957 4.756 3.899 3.872 1.567 1.463 
obs 182 182 182 266 266 266 132 132 169 169 169 247 247 247 114 114 
number of sectors 11 11 11 18 18 18 18 18 11 11 11 18 18 18 17 17 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for the United States, all sectors 
  Within Estimator First Difference Estimator  
USA_1 USA_2 USA _3 USA _4 USA _5 USA _6 USA _7 USA _8 USA _1 USA _2 USA _3 USA _4 USA _5 USA _6 USA _7 USA _8 
growth -0.233***  -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.279*** -0.278*** -0.270*** -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.228*** -0.232*** -0.225*** -0.309*** -0.304*** -0.303*** -0.345*** -0.345***  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital stock_t-1 0.241*** 0.245*** 0.218*** 
     
0.121*** 0.136*** 0.120*** 
     
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
     
int. imports_t-1 -0.520*** -0.429** -0.017 
     
-0.509 -0.532 -0.394 
     
 
(0.010) (0.033) (0.950) 
     
(0.284) (0.268) (0.467) 
     
other imports_t-
1 
-1.176*** -1.092*** -0.990*** 
     
-0.387 -0.376 -0.332 
     
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
(0.216) (0.251) (0.251) 
     
social 
government_t-1 
 
-0.032 
  
0.008 
 
-0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.021 
  
0.023 
 
-0.037 -0.037 
  
(0.375) 
  
(0.750) 
 
(0.758) (0.858) 
 
(0.418) 
  
(0.154) 
 
(0.133) (0.141) 
bargaining 
cov_t-1 
  
0.009**     0.019*** 
   
h 0.005 
  
0.012** 
  
   
(0.015)     (0.000) 
    
(0.501) 
  
(0.032) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.036*** -0.037*** -0.000 0.021 0.022 
   
-0.020** -0.024** -0.000 0.059* 0.059     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.955) (0.145) (0.154) 
   
(0.041) (0.021) (0.999) (0.097) (0.136) 
non-ICT 
capital_t-1 
   
0.209*** 0.211*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
   
0.227*** 0.220*** 0.197*** 0.124 0.124 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.117) 
outward FDI_t-
1 
   
0.849** 0.834** 1.305*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 
   
0.139 0.143 0.194 0.232 0.232 
    
(0.030) (0.027) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.517) (0.503) (0.380) (0.360) (0.352) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
-0.150 -0.150 
      
-0.215* -0.215        
(0.190) (0.188) 
      
(0.072) (0.114) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
-0.013 -0.013 
      
-0.030** -0.030**        
(0.314) (0.280) 
      
(0.012) (0.011) 
fin. payments_t-
1 
      
-0.031 -0.032 
      
-0.102*** -0.102*** 
       
(0.256) (0.139) 
      
(0.005) (0.005) 
migration_t-1 
      
0.702 0.667 
      
1.194 1.195*        
(0.522) (0.598) 
      
(0.114) (0.097) 
gini_t-1 
       
0.001 
       
-0.000         
(0.943) 
       
(0.997) 
constant 0.659*** 0.844*** 0.479*** 1.964*** 1.924*** 1.407*** 2.187*** 2.142** 
        
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.037) 
        
withR2 0.558 0.565 0.576 0.503 0.504 0.561 0.462 0.462 0.333 0.332 0.330 0.342 0.344 0.351 0.488 0.482 
F-test 75.900 70.075 96.864 485.939 388.970 201.519 6662.180 1899.821 20.768 17.150 17.135 12.809 10.311 10.515 4.139 3.907 
obs 146 146 146 257 257 257 122 122 134 134 134 241 241 241 107 107 
number of 
sectors 
8 8 8 13 13 13 13 13 8 8 8 13 13 13 13 13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6: Estimation results for Denmark, all sectors 
 Within Estimator First Difference Estimator 
 DNK_1 DNK _2 DNK _3 DNK _4 DNK _5 DNK _6 DNK _7 DNK _8 DNK _1 DNK _2 DNK _3 DNK _4 DNK _5 DNK _6 DNK _7 DNK _8 
growth -0.117** -0.115** -0.118** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.312*** -0.317*** -0.257*** -0.260*** -0.256*** -0.292*** -0.303*** -0.291*** -0.291*** -0.295***  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital stock_t-1 0.064 0.043 0.066 
     
0.161*** 0.178*** 0.159*** 
     
 
(0.129) (0.292) (0.121) 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
int. imports_t-1 0.152 -0.047 0.168 
     
-0.099 -0.092 -0.095 
     
 
(0.175) (0.754) (0.143) 
     
(0.579) (0.614) (0.596) 
     
other imports_t-1 0.402** 0.161 0.419** 
     
0.010 0.015 0.016 
     
 
(0.030) (0.463) (0.027) 
     
(0.965) (0.946) (0.944) 
     
social government_t-1 
 
0.017*** 
  
0.005 
 
-0.008 0.010 
 
-0.011** 
  
-0.016 
 
-0.007 0.001   
(0.002) 
  
(0.488) 
 
(0.338) (0.116) 
 
(0.031) 
  
(0.158) 
 
(0.604) (0.955) 
sec. union density_t-1 
  
0.000 
  
-0.002 
    
0.001 
  
-0.004 
  
   
(0.647) 
  
(0.170) 
    
(0.595) 
  
(0.581) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.014 
   
0.019 0.030 0.009 0.017 0.035     
(0.102) (0.264) (0.691) (0.934) (0.125) 
   
(0.394) (0.215) (0.772) (0.587) (0.305) 
non-ICT capital_t-1 
   
0.057** 0.056** 0.054** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
   
0.175*** 0.182*** 0.185*** 0.196*** 0.186***     
(0.027) (0.028) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
outward FDI_t-1 
   
0.023* 0.022 0.021 0.068*** 0.066*** 
   
0.030 0.026 0.029 0.025 0.022     
(0.098) (0.113) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.267) (0.310) (0.277) (0.335) (0.396) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
0.111 0.004 
      
-0.142 -0.197        
(0.111) (0.949) 
      
(0.410) (0.270) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
-0.020** -0.012 
      
-0.001 0.004        
(0.033) (0.271) 
      
(0.957) (0.783) 
fin. payments_t-1 
      
-0.004 0.002 
      
-0.010 -0.009        
(0.645) (0.797) 
      
(0.330) (0.422) 
migration_t-1 
      
-0.868 -0.643 
      
5.374 4.446        
(0.621) (0.714) 
      
(0.172) (0.250) 
gini_t-1 
       
0.010*** 
       
0.011*         
(0.005) 
       
(0.061) 
constant 0.740*** 0.489*** 0.700*** 1.041*** 0.950*** 1.132*** 0.998*** 1.027*** 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
        
withR2/adjR2 0.131 0.156 0.131 0.246 0.247 0.251 0.324 0.336 0.399 0.405 0.397 0.349 0.352 0.345 0.345 0.355 
F-test 7.749 52.674 6.438 89.572 90.042 86.888 89067.965 600.337 24.388 21.279 20.836 11.734 9.331 10.094 7.072 7.023 
obs 339 339 339 152 152 152 127 127 318 318 318 111 111 111 111 111 
number of sectors 17 17 17 15 15 15 15 15 17 17 17 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Estimation results for Italy, all sectors 
  Within Estimator First Difference Estimator  
ITA_1 ITA _2 ITA _3 ITA _4 ITA _5 ITA _6 ITA _7 ITA _8 ITA _1 ITA _2 ITA _3 ITA _4 ITA _5 ITA _6 ITA _7 ITA _8 
growth -0.176** -0.177** -0.189** -0.290*** -0.278*** -0.286*** -0.230*** -0.241*** -0.135** -0.137*** -0.146*** -0.252*** -0.248*** -0.254*** -0.222*** -0.222***  
(0.025) (0.023) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital stock_t-1 0.051 0.031 0.084* 
     
-0.006 -0.022 0.004 
     
 
(0.133) (0.327) (0.057) 
     
(0.945) (0.797) (0.967) 
     
int. imports_t-1 -0.263 -0.297 0.591* 
     
-0.702* -0.637 -0.532 
     
 
(0.500) (0.385) (0.065) 
     
(0.073) (0.108) (0.211) 
     
other imports_t-1 0.275** 0.121 0.211** 
     
0.244** 0.238** 0.215* 
     
 
(0.013) (0.184) (0.050) 
     
(0.021) (0.031) (0.051) 
     
social 
government_t-1 
 
0.014** 
  
0.023*** 
 
-0.003 0.006 
 
0.012* 
  
0.014*** 
 
0.001 0.001 
  
(0.023) 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.710) (0.504) 
 
(0.065) 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.936) (0.945) 
sec. union 
density_t-1 
  
0.005** 
  
-0.002 
    
0.004** 
  
0.004 
  
   
(0.017) 
  
(0.478) 
    
(0.044) 
  
(0.117) 
  
ICT capital_t-1 
   
-0.028** -0.043*** -0.040** -0.088*** -0.080** 
   
-0.006 -0.024 0.006 -0.076* -0.076*     
(0.018) (0.000) (0.016) (0.003) (0.014) 
   
(0.776) (0.372) (0.788) (0.059) (0.099) 
non-ICT 
capital_t-1 
   
0.190*** 0.193*** 0.210*** 0.290*** 0.278*** 
   
0.203*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
(0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) 
outward FDI_t-1 
   
-0.202 -0.303** -0.125 -0.247 -0.272 
   
-0.266 -0.385 -0.310 -0.270 -0.270     
(0.111) (0.039) (0.417) (0.256) (0.214) 
   
(0.368) (0.174) (0.295) (0.317) (0.304) 
hh debt_t-1 
      
0.070*** 0.073*** 
      
0.046 0.046        
(0.001) (0.002) 
      
(0.280) (0.272) 
fin. income_t-1 
      
0.000 -0.007 
      
0.021 0.021        
(0.978) (0.723) 
      
(0.128) (0.288) 
fin. payments_t-1 
      
0.037 0.082 
      
-0.075 -0.076        
(0.505) (0.154) 
      
(0.151) (0.333) 
migration_t-1 
      
0.738*** 0.433 
      
0.198 0.200        
(0.005) (0.114) 
      
(0.447) (0.497) 
gini_t-1 
       
0.009 
       
-0.000         
(0.123) 
       
(0.981) 
constant 0.604*** 0.482*** 0.340*** 1.627*** 1.302*** 1.726*** 1.630*** 1.240** 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 
        
withR2 0.205 0.232 0.270 0.472 0.594 0.478 0.535 0.541 0.247 0.256 0.257 0.229 0.261 0.232 0.277 0.271 
F-test 12.028 28.471 16.892 62.314 117.719 61.857 291.066 723.246 11.218 10.987 10.595 12.325 10.762 11.179 4.152 4.026 
obs 139 139 139 239 218 239 166 166 130 130 130 215 194 215 142 142 
number of sectors 8 8 8 21 21 21 21 21 8 8 8 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Estimation results for Spain, all sectors 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well 
as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities). Estimation methods in column 
titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Within Estimator First Difference Estimator  
ESP_1 ESP _2 ESP _3 ESP _4 ESP _5 ESP _6 ESP _7 ESP _8 ESP _1 ESP _2 ESP _3 ESP _4 ESP _5 ESP _6 ESP _7 ESP _8 
growth -0.147*** -0.135* -0.165*** -0.094** -0.237*** -0.046 -0.243*** -0.099*** -0.178*** -0.197*** -0.178*** -0.110 -0.182 -0.107 -0.188 -0.127  
(0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.023) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.316) (0.192) (0.356) (0.193) (0.264) 
capital stock_t-1 0.086*** 0.091** 0.088***      0.179*** 0.161** 0.179***       
(0.002) (0.036) (0.002)      (0.001) (0.018) (0.001)      
int. imports_t-1 0.467* 0.477 0.577**      0.105 -0.301 0.107       
(0.095) (0.124) (0.041)      (0.725) (0.360) (0.722)      
other imports_t-1 -0.050 -0.151*** 0.014      -0.000 -0.128 -0.000       
(0.596) (0.001) (0.895)      (0.998) (0.134) (0.995)      
social 
government_t-1  -0.030**   -0.042***     -0.013   -0.024     
 (0.027)   (0.000)     (0.357)   (0.107)    
sec. union 
density_t-1   0.008**   0.003***     -0.000   0.000    
  (0.021)   (0.000)     (0.958)   (0.907)   
ICT capital_t-1    -0.081*** -0.043* -0.088*** 0.004 -0.091***    0.019 0.047 0.018 0.075 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.852) (0.000)    (0.774) (0.492) (0.785) (0.377) (0.997) 
non-ICT 
capital_t-1    0.368*** 0.398*** 0.355*** 0.367*** 0.378***    -0.024 0.011 -0.022 0.018 0.002  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.805) (0.925) (0.821) (0.873) (0.988) 
outward FDI_t-1    -0.133* -0.174** -0.174** -0.112 -0.145**    -0.218* -0.228** -0.219* -0.180 -0.233*  
   (0.084) (0.039) (0.019) (0.168) (0.046)    (0.078) (0.042) (0.077) (0.188) (0.061) 
hh debt_t-1       0.156        0.161   
      (0.220)        (0.394)  
fin. income_t-1       0.007        0.026   
      (0.846)        (0.663)  
fin. payments_t-1       -0.532**        -0.417   
      (0.011)        (0.233)  
migration_t-1        0.480        0.845  
       (0.345)        (0.247) 
constant 0.508*** 0.809*** 0.303*** 2.146*** 2.947*** 1.979*** 1.424** 2.104***          
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000)         
withR2 0.222 0.324 0.304 0.656 0.694 0.666 0.709 0.657 0.149 0.145 0.143 0.089 0.114 0.060 0.065 0.079 
F-test 17.374 32.767 28.689 236.139 17.204 290.222 67.474 335.133 4.145 4.419 3.297 1.204 1.375 0.943 0.953 1.122 
Obs 152 115 152 53 53 53 53 53 142 105 142 36 36 36 36 36 
number of sectors 9 9 9 15 15 15 15 15 9 9 9 13 13 13 13 13 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Sectoral classification (based on isic4) and skill taxonomy – 2 digits 
isic4 
code 
sector description manufacturin
g 
service
s 
high-
skilled 
low-
skilled 
TOTAL total 
    
01-03 agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
   
x 
05-09 mining and quarrying 
   
x 
10-12 food products, beverages and tobacco x 
  
x 
13 textiles x 
  
x 
14 wearing apparel x 
  
x 
15 leather and related products x 
  
x 
16 wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture x 
  
x 
17 paper and paper products x 
 
x 
 
18 printing and reproduction of recorded media x 
 
x 
 
19 coke and refined petroleum products x 
 
x 
 
20 chemicals and chemical products x 
 
x 
 
21 pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations x 
 
x 
 
22 rubber and plastics products x 
  
x 
23 other non-metallic mineral products x 
  
x 
24 basic metals x 
  
x 
25 fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment x 
  
x 
26 computer, electronic and optical products x 
 
x 
 
27 electrical equipment x 
 
x 
 
28 machinery and equipment n.e.c. x 
 
x 
 
29 motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers x 
  
x 
30 other transport equipment x 
  
x 
31-33 furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation x 
  
x 
35-39 electricity, gas, steam, etc.; sewerage, waste management, etc. 
 
x x 
 
41-43 construction 
 
x 
 
x 
45-47 wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
 
x x 
 
49-52 transportation and storage 
 
x x 
 
53 postal and courier activities  x x  
55-56 accommodation and food service activities  x x  
58-60 publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities  x x 
 
62-63 it and other information services 
 
x x 
 
64-66 financial and insurance activities 
 
x x 
 
68 real estate activities 
 
x x 
 
69-82 professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative, 
etc. 
 
x x 
 
84 public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
 
x x 
 
85 education 
 
x x 
 
86-88 human health and social work activities 
 
x x 
 
90-96 arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities 
 
x x 
 
97-98 activities of households as employers 
 
x x 
 
99 activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
 
x x 
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Table A1 continued: Sectoral classification (based on isic4) and skill taxonomy – 1 digit 
isic4 
code 
sector description manufacturin
g 
service
s 
high-
skilled 
low-
skilled 
TOTAL total 
    
01-03 agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
   
x 
05-09 mining and quarrying 
   
x 
10-12 food products, beverages and tobacco x 
  
x 
13-15 textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products x 
  
x 
16-18 wood and paper products, and printing x 
 
x 
 
19 coke and refined petroleum products x 
   
20-21 chemical and pharmaceutical products x 
   
22-23 rubber and plastics products; non-metallic mineral products x 
  
x 
24-25 metals and metal products, except machinery and equipment x 
  
x 
26 computer, electronic and optical products x 
   
27 electrical equipment x 
 
x 
 
28 machinery and equipment n.e.c. x 
 
x 
 
29-30 transport equipment x 
  
x 
31-33 furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation x 
   
35-39 electricity, gas, steam, etc.; sewerage, waste management, etc. 
 
x x 
 
41-43 construction 
 
x 
 
x 
45-47 wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
 
x x 
 
49-52 transport and storage 
 
x x 
 
53 Postal and courier activities  x x  
55-56 accommodation and food service activities 
 
x x 
 
58-60 publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
 
x x 
 
61 telecommunications 
 
x x 
 
62-63 it and other information services 
 
x x 
 
64-66 financial and insurance activities 
 
x x 
 
68 real estate activities 
 
x x 
 
69-82 professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative, 
etc. 
 
x x 
 
84 public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
 
x x 
 
85 education 
 
x x 
 
86-88 human health and social work activities 
 
x x 
 
94-96 arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities 
 
x x 
 
97-98 activities of households as employers 
 
x x 
 
99 activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
 
x x 
 
 
